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In our last issue we referred briefly to Mr. Justice Hagner's
decision on the Income Tax question, of which only a newspaper
report was then available. Since then, we have seen the full
official report of the opinion, and we think that a condensed state-
ment of the objections taken to the tax, and the way they are
disposed of by the Court, will usefully supplement our former
review of the earlier objections and decisions on the subject.
The case was Afoore v. Miller, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
and it prayed an injunction to restrain the defendant from col-
lecting income tax from the complainant.
The bill contained five specific objections to the tax, viz: (i)
Duplication; (2 ) Discrimination; (,3) Inclusion of Aliens; (4) N&
exception of the incomes of corporations which, although carried
on for profit, are instrumentalities and agencies of the State gov-
ernments, and, as such, are not subject to taxation by the United
States; (5) That assessments are to be made upon income earned
and received prior to the time at which the provisions of the Act
took effect.
The objection that the tax was in the nature of a direct tax,
although adverted to by complainant's counsel, was not insisted
on under the decisions in Slpringer v. U. S., r02 U. S. 586, and
Pacific Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 446.
The Court dealt with these specific objections as follows:
ist. As to Duplication, which is to be understood as referring
to an assessment on income derived from dividends on stock in
corporations, such corporations being themselves assessed on their
profits.
The Court holds that it is fair to presume that the Treasury
will enforce this provision of the Act in such a manner as to pre-
vent a harsh construction. But it is settled law that, vexatious as
a Duplication may be, it is not possible practically to avoid it in
every case. No question of constitutional law is thereby raised, and
the legislative control is complete.
2d1. The exemption of incomes not exceeding $4000 is not dis-
crimination between citizens. The tax is uniform when it ope-
rates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject is found. There is no discrimination in the Act between
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the different persons who are authorized to avail themselves of the
$40oo exemption; every -person is equally entitled to its benefits.
3d. The inclusion of resident aliens in the provisions of the Act
works no injury to the complainant, and a party applying for an
injunction must show some personal grievance, actually existing
or impending. Furthermore, the inclusion is justifiable because
the protection of the government, to which such aliens are entitled,
is the consideration for which taxes are demanded.
4/th. The complainant not having alleged that he is interested,
as a shareholder or otherwise, in such corporations as this objec-
tion refers to, again fails to show the personal grievance or injury
that would entitle him to an injunction. But the statute does not
in words, or by necessary implication, include such corporations,
and, having no power to tax them, it is to be presumed that Con-
gress did not intend to include them.
5th. The very point appears to have been decided in Stockdale
v. Insurance CO., 20 Wall. 331, where Mr. Justice Miller says, "The
right of Congress to have imposed this tax by a new statute,"
"although the measure of it was governed by the income of the"
"past years, cannot be doubted; much less can it be doubted"
"that it could impose such a tax on the income of the current"
"year, though part of that year had elapsed when the statute"
"was passed. The joint resolution of July 4 th, 1864, imposed a"
"tax of 5 per cent on all incomes of the previous year, although"
"one tax on it had already been paid, and no one doubted the"
"validity of the Act, or attempted to resist it."
Having thus dealt with the specific objections, the Court shows
that a Court of Equity will not pronounce an act unconstitutional
without the clearest proof of the violation of the Constitution, nor
will it enjoin the collection of a tax merely because of the illegal-
ity, hardship, or irregularity of it. Some special circumstances,
bringing the case under some head of equity jurisdiction, must be
shown. The alleged special grounds in the present case are the
absence of adequate remedy to recover the taxes if paid over, and
that, if such remedy exist, a multiplicity of suits would result.
Both these grounds the Court holds to be untenable. For if a
party pays, under protest, a tax to a collector having no legal
right to demand it, he can recover it back, and the party receiving
it cannot escape responsibility by having paid it over to the gov-
ernment. And although separate actions at law would have to be
brought for each successive year, each suit would present different
features constituting a distinct cause of action, and the relief by
injunction on the ground of multiplicity of suits can only be
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granted when the subject matter of the litigation is substantially
the same, and not where each has a distinct object, founded on
distinct and separate grounds. Finally, the Court holds that sec-
tion 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, forbidding
any suit to be brought for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any tax, is broad enough in its terms to cover
a special tax like the income tax. The objection that that section
only applies to real revenue acts and not to counterfeits of them is
met by the following quotation from Mr. Justice Blatchford in
Snyder v. Marks, iog U. S. 192: "There is therefore no force in"
"the suggestion that Section 3224, in speaking of a tax, means"
"only a legal tax, and that an illegal tax is not a tax and so does"
"not fall within the intention of the statute, and the collection of"
"it may be restrained. The statute clearly applies to the present"
'suit, and forbids the granting of relief by injunction."
Congress, by the statutes recently passed, regulating immigra-
tion has given final jurisdiction over aliens applying for admission
to the appropriate immigration officers with appeal to the Secretary
of the Treasury. Several cases turning on the construction of
these statutes have been brought into the Federal Courts, and two
interesting and apparently antagonistic decisions are reported in
63 Fed. Rep. 263, and 64 Fed. Rep. 485. The first, In re Howard,
was a petition for writ of habeas corpus to obtain release from cus-
tody in which the relator was held as an immigrant entering in
violation of the contract-labor law. Although the relator proved
clearly that he was entitled to enter this country under the clause
of the above act admitting "persons employed strictly as domestic
servants," nevertheless, following the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Nishimura Ekiu's Case, 142 U. S. 66o, and in Fong Yue Ting
V. U. S., I49 U. S. 698, which uphold the right of Congress to give
final determination of the status of an immigrant to federal officers,
the Court held that it could not overrule the Secretary's decision,
and that his "grant of power should be construed as expressed."
The other seemingly contradictory decision, was given on a
motion to quash a writ of habeas corpus sued out on behalf of Fom
Yum, a passenger on the steamer Gaidc, who claimed to be an
American-born citizen. By the terms of a clause in the Sundry
Civil Appropriation Act of August i8, 1894, inaking a decision of
the appropriate immigration officer to the admission of an alien
final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Court here held that power was not given to such officers to
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determine the preliminary question whether a person coming into
the United States is a citizen or an alien. The power given to
such officer summarily to determine the status of aliens was recog-
nized, but not the power to decide who is an " alien immigrant,"
for, says the Court, "1 it is difficult to see how his decision upon a
fact on which his very jurisdiction rests can be deemed conclusive."
The conflict in these cases is, however, only apparent. The peti-
tioners were held for deportation under different statutes, and, in
Howard's case, while it showed that he belonged to a class of
immigrants privileged to enter this country, the fact that he was
an "1 alien" and an "immigrant," made the Secretary final judge.
The Fom Yum decision indicates a legitimate jealousy of a too
liberal construction of legislative grants of power.
